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1 INTRODUCTION
The theory and practice of counterpart funds sounds
like a dry and technical subject. It is. But new readers
should not despair. As the authoritative articles in this
issue of the Bulletin amply demonstrate, the topic of
counterpart funds repays further study. Counterpart
funds themselves play an important, growing and often
controversial role in developing countries. More to the
point, the topic is replete with linkages to broader
issues in development: poverty targeting, aid
conditionality, the management of the budgetary
process - and many others.
To set the scene: 'counterpart funds' are 'local currency
generated by the sale of foreign exchange or commodity
aid, over the use of which the donor retains some
control' (Bruton and Hill 1991 and in Section 3 of this
Bulletin). They typically arise from programme aid,
where foreign exchange is sold to importers; from food
aid, where commodities are sold to mills or processing
plants; and, more rarely, from sales of other
commodities, such as fertilizer. Not all such
transactions generate counterpart funds, since not all
donors try to 'retain control' over local currency
generated by their aid. Nevertheless, many donors do
insist on setting up a fund which gives them some
control over how local currency is spent.
Unfortunately, there is no international data series on
counterpart funds. The figures cited by Fell in his
article here imply that between 3 per cent and 12 per
cent of all aid by DAC members may generate
counterpart funds, but for some donors and many
recipients, the figure is higher: between 10 per cent and
15 per cent for the European Community (Maxwell
1991, quoted by Tincani in this Bulletin), up to 20 per
cent in the Sahel (Club du Sahel et al 1991, quoted by
Fell) and potentially as high as 60 per cent in
Mozambique (Riley in this volume). These are not high
figures by historical standards: more than 40 per cent of
Marshall Aid to Europe after World War II consisted
of food, feed and fertilizer, most of which generated
counterpart funds (Singer et al 1987).
Of course, aid plays a relatively small part in the
economies of many countries, so that counterpart funds
do not always make a large contribution to the
government budget or the money supply (Bruton and
Hill 1991 and in Section 2). There are exceptions,
however, especially where counterpart funds have been
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allowed to accumulate as unexpended balances. A
much-quoted case is Mozambique, where counterpart
funds in 1990 supplied 30 per cent of the government
budget (Riley in this volume). Another is Bangladesh,
where counterpart funds in the l970s accounted for
40 per cent of the government budget (Maxwell and
Singer 1979). In 1990, unexpended balances were
equivalent to 50 per cent of the money supply in
Madagascar and 91 per cent in Guinea-Bissau (Tincani
in this volume).
Counterpart funds are probably disproportionately
important in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), mainly
because aid itself is disproportionately important:
equivalent to over 8 per cent of GNP in 1987-89,
compared to under 2 per cent in South Asia and under
0.5 per cent in Latin America (World Bank, World
Development Report, various years). In addition, weak
budgetary systems in many African countries mean
that donors are more likely to insist on retaining some
control over the use of local currency generated by aid.
Whether counterpart funds grow in the future will
depend on the net outcome of two conflicting
tendencies. On the one hand, the share of programme
aid in total aid seems likely to rise, given the need to
disburse funds quickly to poor countries and the
pressure to monetise an increasing share of food aid
(World Bank/WFP 1991 and Schulthes in this
volume). This is likely to boost the flow of counterpart
funds. On the other hand, the share of programme aid
which generates counterpart funds seems likely to fall
slowly, as some donors (but not all, as the articles in
Section 4 indicate) become more relaxed about the
earmarking of local currency. This is likely to reduce
the flow of counterpart funds. The most probable
outcome for the rest of the decade is that counterpart
fund generation and use will increase in many poor
countries, especially in SSA.
2 ISSUES IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
COUNTERPART FUNDS
There has been a regular ebb and flow in discussion of
counterpart funds since the early debate about
Marshall Aid (e.g. McLeod 1950). There was a peak in
the literature in the early 1960s, stimulated by
controversy over the accumulation of US food aid
counterpart funds in India, but then a lull (Maxwell
and Singer 1979). This was broken as programme aid
expanded in the 1980s and as attention shifted to SSA
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(Roemer 1989, Clément 1989, Bruton and Hill 1991).
The debate over the monetisation of food aid also
revived interest in the generation, management and
targeting of food aid counterpart funds (WFP l987a;
1987b; World Bank/WFP ibid). Owens (1991) has
assembled an annotated bibliography of over 100
contributions to different aspects of the topic.
As a result of all this attention, the basic
macroeconomics of counterpart funds are well
understood. The first round effects are set out here in
careful papers by Bruton and Hill (in Section 2) and by
Clément. The second and subsequent round effects are
explored by Maxwell and Green. Counterpart funds do
not represent a new resource, over and above the
original aid transfer, but they can have substantial
effects on the money supply, the balance of payments,
the composition of demand and the government
budget.
In the simplest (first round) case, the sale of foreign
exchange or commodities removes purchasing power
from the economy and is deflationary; by contrast, the
expenditure of counterpart funds increases the demand
for goods and services and is reflationary. If these two
events happen simultaneously, their effects cancel out.
If, however, there is a long lag before the counterpart
fund is spent, and especially if monetary compensation
takes place in the meantime to counteract the original
leakage, the effect of the counterpart fund expenditure
may be inflationary. In the second and subsequent
rounds of expenditure, consumption multipliers and
production linkages arising from counterpart fund
expenditure generate varying patterns of demand for
different products, so that there are consequences for
distribution between sectors; and, at the same time,
additional demand for imports is generated, some of
which will be for consumer goods. There are many
variations to this story, which the articles explore. In
particular, counterpart funds may be sterilized and
used to pay back government debt, in which case the
effects on the real economy are muted.
Within this framework, attention has focused on three
main issues, each of which has linkages to wider
development debates; first, how to improve the poverty
targeting of programme aid; second, whether counter-
part funds are needed or not, which links to the general
question of aid conditionality; and third, how to
improve the management of counterpart funds, which
sheds light on the budgetary process. In addition to
these major topics, other themes discussed in the
papers include absorptive capacity, fiscal dependence
and the inter-annual calibration of counterpart funds
(see especially the papers by Maxwell and Green):
these too raise questions of broader interest.
a Poverty targeting through programme aid
Poverty reduction has again (and at last) risen to the top
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of the international agenda (World Bank 1990; 1991;
UN 1991). There are two main debates about the
contribution counterpart funds might make. The first
concerns programme aid provided in the form of
general or sectoral import support programmes. These
often have Balance of Payments support as the primary
objective. If more specific developmental or poverty
reduction objectives appear at all, they are usually
found only in second place. The question is whether the
counterpart fund mechanism can offer a way of
overcoming this disadvantage and establishing a more
direct link between Balance of Payments support and
poverty reduction. The second debate is related but
applies more specifically to food aid. It is about
whether food aid commodities are best delivered in
kind, or whether it is more appropriate to sell
('monetise') the commodities on the market, pay the
proceeds into a counterpart fund and use these
resources to help meet poverty reduction or food
security objectives.
To take food aid first, monetisation has generated
considerable controversy: some believe that only
project food aid delivered in kind can be targeted
effectively on the poor; others see equal scope in
counterpart fund arrangements (World Bank/WFP
l991:23ff). The debate is reviewed here by Schuithes,
who identifies three major constraints to increased
monetisation: bureaucratic inertia in food aid agencies;
absorptive capacity in recipient countries; and the
nature of food aid distributed in kind, which, he
suggests, is effectively self-targeting on the poor.
However, Schulthes goes on to argue that the
constraints must be overcome if food aid is to make a
larger contribution to poverty reduction. He presents a
checklist of conditions under which monetisation may
be the preferred option for targeted food aid
programmes (see also Maxwell and Owens 1991:21)
and suggests that monetised project food aid 'may lead
the way to greater effectiveness of programme food
aid'. Monetisation is appropriate wherever targeting
can successfully and cost-effectively be achieved with
cash without destabilizing local food markets.
Sculthes argues that the choice between direct
distribution and monetisation should become a routine
element of project design. Reporting on a workshop
held at the IDS in January 1991, Maxwell and Owens
go further: they conclude that there should be a
presumption in favour of monetisation and conclude
that 'direct distribution should only be considered
where monetisation seems to be infeasible - because of
difficulties of targeting, market failure or administrative
barriers (Maxwell and Owens 1991:17)'.
Other articles tackle the more general debate and show
how counterpart funds can be used to translate
programme aid into domestic poverty-reduction
programmes. The Social Funds cited by Gardiner are
good examples. In Peru, Canadian counterpart funds
were channelled to an independent organization with
administrative and operational autonomy, which
specialized in the informal sector, small business
development and the health and welfare sectors. In
Bolivia, a 'public by-pass agency' was established, with
multi-donor support, to fund social and economic
infrastructure: in 1989 the Fondo Social de Emergencia
was responsible for about 80 per cent of all public
investment in health and about 75 per cent in
education.
Other donors have followed a similar route. In an
interesting institutional development, USAID has
used local currency from economic support programmes
and food aid to establish endowments benefiting non-
profit private foundations in the fields of agricultural
research, natural resource management or training
(USAID 1990). 'Debt for environment' and 'debt for
development' swaps also offer a close analogy to
counterpart funds: here without a new inflow of
commodities or cash, although there may be savings on
foreign exchange for debt servicing (Griffiths-Jones
1992).
All these examples show that improved poverty
targeting of programme aid is closely bound up with
the generation and management of counterpart funds.
Indeed, counterpart funds may provide a way of
resolving a common dilemma of aid, which is how to
disburse aid more rapidly without sacrificing a poverty
focus (Healey and Winpenny 1991).
b Conditionality and counterpart funds
A purist might object to the discussion so far on the
grounds that counterpart funds are merely an
inefficient way of securing greater conditionality over
government policy and the size and composition of the
government budget. It is well known that counterpart
funds themselves are not an additional resource, over
and above the aid which generates them (Singer 1964).
In that case, counterpart funds might be viewed as an
unnecessary distraction from the core task of policy
dialogue on the fiscal and monetary aggregates.
The purist position on counterpart funds is stated most
clearly here by Clément, who argues for a 'clean'
budgetary process in which counterpart funds are
'untied', effectively abolished, and merged into the
government budget. This would avoid possible
conflicts between individual donor priorities for
spending accounts they control and the fiscal or credit
targets agreed by the recipient country with the IMF
and the World Bank. It would, as Green suggests,
replace complex and disparate counterpart fund
negotiations with 'an overall dialogue on resource use,
with the proceeds of monetised commodity assistance
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flowing directly into general revenue'. There would be
no problems with the fungibility of government
expenditure, no headaches with administration, no risk
of undermining shaky budgetary procedures in the
recipient country and no risk that the accumulation of
counterpart funds would create economic and political
problems in the future.
Most economists might be expected to follow this line
and it is indeed seen by many of the contributors as an
ideal to be pursued. A surprising number, however, see
virtue in counterpart funds, not only for donors but
also for recipients, and especially in a second best world
characterized by weak budgetary processes and, often,
poor policy. Among the advantages claimed and
examples cited are preserving social expenditures that
governments are unable or unwilling to fund directly
(Green, Tincani, Schuithes), the ability to channel
resources to the voluntary sector (Gardiner) or the
private sector (Bruton and Hill in Section 3) and, in
general, guaranteeing minimum developmental
effectiveness in countries with poor budgetary
procedures (McClelland). Counterpart funds may be a
clumsy device, but, as Bruton and Hill conclude, their
'flexibility and peculiarities' can be harnessed to
'accomplish things that otherwise could not be
accomplished'. There are many examples in the papers,
from the privatisation of public sector companies in
Costa Rica (Bruton and Hill in Section 3), through the
creation of social funds in Bolivia and Peru (Gardiner),
to proposals for the creation of a famine fund in
Ethiopia (Beishaw).
c The management of counterpart funds
Whatever the theoretical case for counterpart funds,
the articles contain a litany of complaints about
practical management: the failure to credit sales
proceeds; the use of counterpart funds, resulting in
unwanted and potentially destabilizing accumulation;
very poor accounting and reporting; and, from the
recipient point of view, bewilderment in the face of
complex, time-consuming and diverse donor accounting
requirements. The cases cited here provide illustrations
of the weakness of the budgetary process in many
developing countries.
Some of the most difficult problems arise in valuing
commodities and ensuring that the full value is
transferred to the counterpart fund. In many cases,
commodities are undervalued, at a price which does not
reflect the full import cost; in others, large deductions
are made for administrative purposes; in still others,
the recipient simply does not credit the account.
Mozambique has been a particularly acute case (Riley).
More generally, the European Community has
estimated that a full 25 per cent of the counterpart value
from its import support and food aid disappears as
'leakage' before the fund is credited (Knop 1989,
quoted by Tincani).
A related problem is poor reporting and accounting.
The difficulty facing recipient countries can be seen
from the fact that Mozambique has substantial
counterpart fund programmes with as many as ten
different donors, all requiring different procedures
(Riley). However, attempts to introduce 'common',
multi-donor counterpart funds have made little
progress, in Mozambique or elsewhere (Riley,
Schuithes).
Finally, the question of what to do about 'overhangs' of
unspent balances has been a recurrent concern since
the Indian experience of the 1960s. When accumulations
take place, there have almost always been compensations
in monetary policy at an earlier stage, so that spending
the fund would be inflationary, Furthermore, the size
of the fund makes control a political issue between
donor and recipient. The solution agreed between
India and the US in the 1960s was to write-off the
overhang. In the 1 980s and l990s, sterilization or use to
pay off (internal) government debt has been an
increasingly common use (Bruton and Hill in Section 3).
3 THE POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR
COUNTERPART FUNDS
The new wave of interest in counterpart funds has
produced new policy guidelines. In 1991 an
international workshop at the IDS agreed a statement
of guiding principles (Figure 1); the group of donors
working together in the Special Programme of
Assistance to SSA adopted guidelines on counterpart
funds (appended to the paper by Tincani); the
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
adopted new Principles for Programme Assistance,
which include treatment of counterpart funds
(appended to the article by Fell); the European
Community adopted a Resolution on counterpart
funds (discussed by Tincani); and USAID issued new
policy guidelines on the subject (described and
discussed by McClelland). In addition, there has been
progress on the question of food aid monetisation: the
checklist originally presented to the Sussex workshop
by Schulthes and reproduced in modified form in his
article; and new guidelines on monetisation of project
food aid issued by USAID (1991).
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There is broad agreement in all these policy statements
about the role of counterpart funds. Figure 1
summarizes the consensus. Counterpart funds are not
an additional resource, but they do constitute a
mechanism for supporting the government budget.
The key first step is for donors and recipients to agree
on the strategic objectives of policy and on the policies,
programmes and projects required. There may or may
not then be a need for counterpart funds. If there is a
need, they should be planned in advance, credited
without delay at the full import value and disbursed
quickly on agreed objectives, including debt reduction
where appropriate. They should be managed in such a
way as to minimize the administrative load on recipient
countries. Counterpart funds need to be treated with
particular care where they make a substantial
contribution to the budget, the money supply, or the
availability of commodities, at national or regional
levels.
One important provision of the new SPA and DAC
principles is the idea of gradual evolution towards a
situation where counterpart funds are no longer
required. This will be achieved when recipient
countries have efficient budgetary systems and when
the procedures of policy dialogue produce policies and
expenditure patterns that the donors are happy to live
with. Some donors will however have to change the
legislation governing counterpart funds, since they are
at present required to account for counterpart funds in
some detail (as, for example, with US food aid
(McClelland)).
4 THE FUTURE OF COUNTERPART FUNDS
Counterpart funds may indeed wither away in due
course, but seem likely to be with us for some time. In
that case, the first priority is to implement the various
sets of guidelines and narrow the large gap between
best and usual practice (Maxwell in this Bulletin). Iriso
doing, better data and better understanding of the
issues in operational agencies should both result
(Maxwell and Owens 1991). At the same time, the
articles in this volume show that the counterpart fund
mechanism can be used in innovative ways to support
strategic poverty reduction and food security objectives.
5Figure 1: Counterpart funds. A revised statement of princip$es
1 Counterpart funds consist of local currency generated by the sale of aid communities or foreign exchange in
recipient countries, over the use of which the donor has some control.
2 The purpose of most aid which results in counterpart funds is to assíst the recipient country in meeting agreed
strategic objectives, through carrying out specific policies, programmes and projects. It does so by helping to meet
foreign exchange and government financial requirements. The strategic objectives are likely to include poverty
alleviation and food security, as well as stabilization and structural adjustment.
3 Both the provision of aid and the use, when appropriate, of counterpart funds, provide opportunities for dialogue
over the size and composition of government expenditure, with due allowance for fungibility of budgets. In
addition, the planning, use and monitoring of counterpart funds will require attention to policies on poverty
alleviation, taxation, commodity pricing, and macroeconomic and sector policy, in order to maximize the benefit
of aid and avoid the risk of dependency and disincentives. However, government policy, including policy on
government expenditure, should not be developed as an adjunct to aid or counterpart funds - the reverse is the
case.
4 The real resource transfers are represented by the commodity or financial aid inflows, not the counterpart funds.
However, counterpart funds do constitute a mechanism for translating payments for imported goods and services
into government revenue, for use on agreed programmes and projects. They may be especially appropriate if it is
desirable to target or otherwise influence government expenditure.
5 The expenditure of counterpart funds will set in motion a process of expansion of demand for and production of a
varied basket of commodities. For this reason, a diversified basket of aid commodities, including consumer goods,
is necessary to help fill any deficit in commodity balances.
6 Dialogue oi policy issues and budget expenditure will be especially important when the total (commodity)
aid/counterpart fund package supplied by all donors makes a sizeable contribution to commodity supply or the
government budget, at national or regional level. If it does not, then the operating costs of counterpart funds are
likely to outweigh the benefits.
7 The scope for efficient policy dialogue will be weakened if counterpart funds are allowed to accumulate; or if they
are eroded by inflation, implicit subsidies or over-valued exchange rates. It will be strengthened if counterpart
funds are predictable, regular, sizeable and adjusted to the inter-annual fluctuations of the recipient economy.
8 It follows that where counterpart funds are appropriate they shuld be:
planned in advance, preferably in the context of a rolling, multi-year agreement, linked to other aid and with
the possibility of 'substitution actions' on a year to year basis to ensure flexibility;
disbursed in the context of an agreed policy framework, subject to regular monitoring and fully accounted in
the national budget of the recipient;
credited without delay to a government-controlled interest-bearing account at the full cif value, before
subsidies or deductions;
disbursed quickly, following an agreed plan, to the agreed programme and project spending accounts,
including subsidies and domestic debt reduction where appropriate;
subject to the normal budget formulation, accounting, monitoring and evaluation procedures on the financïal
and physical sides;
managed in ways minimizing the administrative load and strengthening national planning, budgeting and
reporting processes, perhaps on a multi-donor basis through the creation of a common counterpart fund
account.
Source: Maxwell and Owens (1991)
REFERENCES
Bruton, H. J. and Hill, C. B., 1991, The Development Impact of
Coi&nterpart Funds, USAID, Washington DC
Clément, J. A. P., 1989, 'The macroeconomic impacts of
counterpart funds', Working Paper WP/89/63, African
Department, International Monetary Fund, Washington,
August
Club du Sahel/COBEA-ORSAY, 1991, 'Premiere analyse
theorique des effects des fonds de contrepartie', Document de
Travail, Club du Sahel/COBEA-ORSAY, November
Griffiths-Jones, S., 1992, 'Debt conversion techniques: an
overview', mimeo, IDS, Sussex, February
Healey, J. M. and Winpenny, J. T., 1991, Overseas
Development: Implementing Labour's Policies, Institute for
Public Policy Research, London, December
Knop, M., 1989, 'Rapport final sur la gestion des fonds de
contrepartie engendres par la vente de l'aide alimentaire de la
CEE', Final Report to the European Community, Brussels,
August
Maxwell, S., 1991, 'The developmental uses of counterpart
funds', a report to the Commission of the European
Community, partly reprinted as Discussion Paper No 289, IDS,
Sussex, June
and Singer, H. W., 1979, 'Food aid to developing countries:
a survey', in World Development 17:3
and Owens, T., 1991, 'Commodity aid and counterpart
funds in Africa', Discussion Paper No 291, IDS, Sussex, June
McLeod, A. N., 1950, 'Local currency proceeds of an import
surplus', International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol 1,
IMF, Washington DC, February
6
Owens, T., 1991, 'Counterpart funds: an annotated
bibliography', Development Bibliography No 6, IDS, Sussex,
November
Roemer, M., 1989, 'The macroeconomics of counterpart
funds - revisited' in World Development, 17:6
Singer, H. W., 1964, 'Use and abuse of counterpart funds', in
InternationalDevelopment: Growth and Change, McGraw Hill,
New York
with Wood, John, and Jennings, Tony, 1987, FoodAid -The
Challenge and the Opportunity, Clarendon Press, Oxford
United Nations, 1991, International Development Strategy for
the Fourth United Nations Development Decade, Resolution
45/1991 adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations,
New York
USAID, 1990, 'Terms of endowment: a new AID approach to
institutional development', Innovative Development Approaches
No 3, USAID, Washington DC, December
1991, PL 480 Title II Guidelines, Agency for International
Development, Washington DC, July
World Food Programme, 1987a, 'Monetisation of WFP food
aid', WFP/CFA 24/5, Rome
1987b, 'The management of funds generated by food-
assisted projects', WFP/CFA 23/5, Rome
World Bank, World Development Report, various years,
Washington
1991, Assistance Strategies to Reduce Poverty: A Policy
Paper, Washington DC
World Bank and World Food Programme, 1991, Food Aid in
Africa: an Agenda for the 1990s, a Joint Study by the World
Bank and the World Food Programme, Washington DC and
Rome, August
